Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a primary transboundary livestock disease of international concern. Outbreaks of the disease have recently occurred in several countries that were previously FMD-free.
Introduction
No. 18082015-00055-EN 4/27 modelling the outbreak to understand the probable size and speed of spread is critically important for emergency preparedness.
Thus, the objectives of this study were to determine specific FMD risk parameters for Minnesota (MN) and the USA and to use these parameters to create a baseline FMD outbreak model for MN. Of specific interest was to assess whether the type of herd in which the outbreak began (a dairy herd or a large-scale swine herd) influenced the basic model outcomes of outbreak size and duration, and to examine the effects of depopulation and movement controls. The study provides information on a detailed baseline model that emergency preparedness planners can use to evaluate response strategies for a potential incursion of FMD into the USA. Output data analysed included the mean number of infected herds and animals, mean duration of active FMD disease and mean duration of the outbreak.
Materials and methods

Description of the model
The North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM), version 3.2.18, was used to simulate an FMD outbreak in MN (the NAADSM User's Guide is accessible at www.naadsm.org). The NAADSM is a stochastic, spatial, state-transition simulation model for the spread of highly contagious diseases of animals. It was developed with broad international support to assist in policy development and decision making in disease incursions (12) .
In the model, investigator input parameters determine disease progression and can be categorised as model population, disease state, and disease transmission and control measures. Wherever possible, parameter values were obtained from the scientific literature.
However, literature review identified very few specifically stated model parameter values that could be used. Parameters that were not documented in the literature were developed using the Delphi method in consultation with subject matter experts (SMEs) (13, 14) . Meetings
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were held with MN SMEs in July and August 2011 to discuss and determine these parameters, which are described in more detail below.
Model population
The population framework on which the model was run requires precise farm locations, designation of production type and numbers of animals at each farm. The MN Board of Animal Health provided data on farm locations and type of livestock at each location. Individual identifying data such as the name and address of the farmer were not included in the location data set. Categories of production type were designated as 'beef', 'dairy', 'small ruminant' (goats and sheep), 'large swine' and 'small swine'. Review of data from the National
Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS) MN survey 2007 together
with SME opinion demonstrated that most dairy, beef and small ruminant operations were of similar size in terms of numbers of animals per premises (Table I) ; no stratification on the basis of size was deemed necessary in these production types. However, for swine operations there was a distinct division based on size and production practices, such that stratification into two separate production types were used: 'large swine' for operations with 1,000 animals or more, and 'small swine' for operations with fewer than 1,000 animals. The number of animals per herd was not consistently available. Population data from NASS were used to provide estimated proxies of numbers of animals on each farm, and the total animal numbers per county for each production type were randomly distributed to the appropriate farm locations within each county.
Disease state-transition parameters
There are four disease state-transition designations in the model: To provide a starting point for the model iterations, a single herd was designated as latently infected on day 0 and referred to as the index herd. However, this first herd infected may not be the first herd detected in the model; this differs from the common epidemiological use of 'index herd' as being the first herd detected and from which contact tracing begins.
Two different types of index herd were selected for this study: dairy and large-scale swine production. Choosing more than one species as an index herd allowed examination of particular species-specific parameters for disease spread, particularly early on in an FMD outbreak when initial spread may be more likely within a production type. This was done for three reasons. First, the species differences in consultation with SMEs suggested that existing differences in biosecurity and management practices in these production types could affect the spread of FMD. The two production types were run separately; that is, the outbreak began in either a dairy or a large swine herd.
Disease transmission parameters
Contact between farms that may result in disease transmission was probability of infection given the contact rates, and the probable distance from infected farm to contacted farm.
Contact rates describe how often each type of contact may occur between production types. For example, a direct contact rate (Table II) of 1.0 between a dairy operation and a beef operation means at least one calf or cow moves from each dairy operation to a beef operation each day. Values greater than one represent more than one such animal movement per day and values less than one represent less frequent contact. Thus, 0.5 (1/2) equals one contact every other day, 0.14 (1/7) equals one contact per week, and so on. The same applies to indirect contact rates (Table III) .
Each direct and indirect contact has an associated probability density function (pdf) for distance from the source farm and a value for (Table IV) varied according to the production types of source and recipient.
The parameter for local contact was set as a 1 km ring around each infected farm. The local contact rate was 0.08 and this decreased linearly as distance from the farm increased.
Control measure parameters
Once a herd becomes infected, the model progresses the herd through four disease state-transitions: susceptible, latent, infectious and recovered/destroyed. Detection of an infected herd depends on
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whether the product of the probability of observation of clinical signs and the probability of reporting those signs was greater than a number between zero and one randomly chosen by the model (15). Detection of an infected herd also causes control measures to be implemented within the model.
Control measures applied to this model included movement
restrictions and depopulation of detected herds. On the basis of SME input, movement restrictions were assumed to be 95% effective for cattle and small ruminants for both direct and indirect contact rates;
for swine, movement restrictions were assumed to be 75% effective for direct contacts rates and 50% effective for indirect contact rates.
These values for effectiveness of movement restriction indicate how much the contact rate was diminished after the first infected herd was detected. For example, in the model for indirect rates for dairy cattle, a contact rate of 1.0 would become 0.05 once movement restrictions were implemented. Movement controls were assumed to be in effect within 24 h of the first herd detected.
The depopulation rate of detected infected herds was set at 20 herds per day, in accordance with the advice of the MN emergency response SMEs. However, depopulation did not begin until 48 h after the first infected herd was detected, to allow time to dispatch the response teams. In order to evaluate the effect of limited depopulation, preemptive depopulation of contiguous farms or farms traced through contact with infected farms was not included in this model; incident management SMEs were consulted to estimate these parameters.
Model scenario output
One thousand iterations were run for each dairy index herd and large Statistical differences between means were evaluated using SAS (9.2).
Multivariate analysis of variance was used to assess mean differences between the testing scenarios, using observations associated with both testing groups. With the index herds as the main explanatory variable, data associated with outbreak duration, number of farms infected, number of animals infected and disease duration were used as the outcome variables. A p value of 0.05 was considered to be statistically significant.
Results
The details of direct contact parameters from live animal movements (Table II) , indirect contact parameters (Table III ) and probability of infection given indirect contacts (Table IV) Differences between the large swine index herd scenarios and the dairy index herd scenarios were found in the outcomes evaluated (Table V) . Thus, the mean values for disease duration, outbreak duration and number of farms and animals infected were larger in the dairy index-herd scenario, where mean disease duration was 54 days, mean outbreak duration was 56 days, mean number of farms infected was 282 and mean number of animals infected was 62,000. For the swine index herd scenario, mean disease duration was 27 days, mean outbreak duration was 27 days, mean number of farms infected was 29 days and the mean number of animals infected was 8,000 (Table V) .
These mean differences were statistically significant (p < 0.0001). The largest outbreak modelled that began in a swine index herd resulted in
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A longer and larger MN outbreak should be anticipated if the index herd is at a dairy farm. Results might also suggest that a longer and larger outbreak should be anticipated if the outbreak begins in an area with a high density of dairy herds, in comparison with an area of high density swine herds (Figs 1 & 2) .
The USDA FMD Response Plans (16) describe six types of outbreak which are categorised according to the number of affected premises.
The categories range from focal (smallest) to catastrophic (largest).
Comparison of the distribution of outbreak sizes between a dairy index herd and a swine index herd (Table VI) In this study, for example, 50.2% of swine index herd iterations infected  5 herds, whereas only 1% of dairy index herd iterations were as limited in size (Table VI) . Conversely, approximately 50% of dairy index herd iterations resulted in > 100 farms infected, but this magnitude of outbreak was reached by only about 7% of swine index herd iterations.
In addition, in dairy index-herd scenarios there was a large gap between the largest five modelled outbreaks (basically uncontrolled outbreaks) and the sixth largest outbreak. These uncontrolled outbreaks were characterised by disease and outbreak duration of more than 600 days, with tens of thousands of farms and more than eight million animals infected. Outcomes associated with the sixth (at the 99.5th percentile) and fifth largest dairy index herd iterations were, respectively, 270 and 639 days for disease/outbreak duration, 1,378
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Discussion
Types of index herd
The model used dairy herds and large swine herds as the designated latently infected index herds because they represent two major MN livestock agriculture industries that would suffer serious consequences in the event of an FMD outbreak. They were also chosen because of differences in species FMD susceptibility and transmissibility, which were reflected in the probabilities of effective contact and disease state-transition parameters that the authors determined by working with MN SMEs. Differences in management and biosecurity measures were evident in the direct and indirect contact rates (Tables II and III) .
Swine herds had very low direct and indirect contact rates with other herds, whereas dairy operations had higher rates of indirect contact and this appears to be a major factor in large FMD outbreaks, as demonstrated here. Outbreaks that began in a dairy index herd had significantly higher mean values for disease duration, outbreak duration, numbers of farms infected and numbers of animals infected when compared with swine index herds ( Table V) .
The results on differences between swine and dairy index herds are supported by other modelling studies (17). Traulsen et al. found that FMD epidemics were long-lasting with a high number of infected farms when the index case was a dairy farm.
The probabilities of observing and reporting clinical signs of FMD were set higher (based on SME input) for large-scale swine productions than for dairy herds. This was because the SMEs considered that clinical signs were more likely/more severe in swine and were more likely to be more rapidly reported by owners/managers of large-scale swine operations. This may help to explain why swine index herd scenarios had more limited spread.
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Biosecurity measures in large-scale swine herds were better than in dairy herds (Tables II and III) ; direct and indirect contact rates were lower both from and into the swine herds than for dairies. Thus, it is not surprising to find differences in outbreak size between these two types of production.
Uncontrolled outbreaks and the limitations of depopulation
Noteworthy outcomes from this study were the uncontrolled outbreaks in the dairy index herd scenarios. In a literature review, no mention of this phenomenon could be found in other outbreak models. However, Indemnity expenses associated with depopulation can be substantial (20) . Indeed, food production systems are at risk of bankruptcy with traditional massive depopulation (20) . Spread of infection outpacing depopulation is an important factor when considering the value of depopulation capacity and outbreak response alternatives to stamping out. The most recent (2011) outbreak in Japan is an example of this situation: the rapid increase in the number of infected farms caused depopulation delays and at the peak of the epidemic more than 100 farms awaited depopulation (21) .
In the present study, the number of herds depopulated per day was not related to herd size. This is in contrast to other studies (18), which specify the number of animals depopulated per day. It is quite possible that depopulation, of large swine herds in particular but also of large dairy herds, could take several days for just one herd. Also, the model immediately assumes no risk of transmission, even indirectly, from a depopulated herd. This is not true in actual practice and other
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Strengths and weaknesses of the study
Use of the NAADSM is a strength of the present study, in part because this model is similar to those used in other countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand (22) . Indeed, differences between the NAADSM and other models were small and would have resulted in recommendation of the same or similar management decisions (22) .
The NAADSM has been thoroughly reviewed and is also used by other states in the USA and by other countries.
A second strength of the study is the detailed description of the model assumptions, including specific parameter values for progression of the disease and between farm contacts. Parameter estimates (Tables II,   III 
Conclusions
Comparison of data between these modelled FMD outbreaks, in which the index herd differed in both species and production system, showed significantly longer and larger outbreaks in dairy index herd scenarios.
Insufficient depopulation capacity was one contributing factor associated with the uncontrolled outbreaks observed in this study. Density of dairy farms in Minnesota
